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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











                                   Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. No. 1-12-cr-00450-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Jerome B. Simandle 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 19, 2015 
 
Before:   SMITH, JORDAN, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 24, 2015) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 George Sepero appeals the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and his attorney moves to 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  For the 
reasons that follow, we will grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the District Court’s 
judgment and sentence. 
I. Background 
 Sepero pled guilty to a three-count Superseding Information charging him with 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count I), wire fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Count II), and tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 
(Count III).  As part of the plea agreement, the parties stipulated to a total offense level of 
24.  The District Court conducted a comprehensive plea hearing, during which it assessed 
whether Sepero’s plea was knowing and voluntary, whether there was a factual basis for 
the plea, and whether Sepero understood the procedures by which he would be sentenced.  
Thereafter, the District Court accepted Sepero’s guilty plea.   
 The U.S. Probation Office prepared a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”) in 
which it calculated a total offense level of 30 – six levels higher than the offense level 
stipulated in the plea agreement.  The six-level difference was the result of three different 
calculations in the PSR.  First, the PSR reflected a loss calculation on Count I that 
exceeded $4 million, which correlated to an 18-level increase from the base offense level.  
The parties had stipulated in the plea agreement to a loss of between $1 million and $2.5 
million, which carried a corresponding 16-level increase over the base offense level 
under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J).  Second, the PSR recommended a two-level 
enhancement based on the number of victims identified for Count I, under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(A).  And third, the PSR recommended a two-level enhancement under 
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U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)1 due to the use of sophisticated means in the crime alleged in 
Count I.  Given a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of I, the 
recommendations in the PSR led to a guidelines range of 97 to 121 months 
imprisonment. 2    
 The District Court conducted a sentencing hearing at which Sepero initially 
challenged the three PSR recommendations noted above.  He later withdrew his 
objections to the latter two enhancements and conceded the facts set forth in the PSR 
relating to the loss amount calculations.  The Court considered the sentencing factors set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as well as Sepero’s request for a downward variance.  
Ultimately, the Court imposed a sentence of 100 months imprisonment, to be followed by 
three years of supervised release.  Sepero timely filed a pro se notice of appeal.   
II. Discussion3 
 Anders v. California provides that a criminal defendant’s counsel may seek to 
withdraw from representing the defendant on appeal if there are no nonfrivolous issues to 
                                              
 1 The PSR incorrectly cited to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C). 
 
 2  In addition to the enhancements noted above, the PSR also recommended a 4-
level enhancement for a violation of commodities law, under U.S.S.G 
§ 2B1.1(b)(18)(B)(I), and a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, under 
U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b), thus resulting in a total offense level of 30, calculated from 
a base offense level of 7.  
 
 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 






challenge.  386 U.S. at 744; United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2000).  
We apply a two-step review when Anders is invoked: first, we determine whether counsel 
has “adequately fulfilled” the requirements of Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a), and, 
second, we examine “whether an independent review of the record presents any 
nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 When deciding whether the first prong has been satisfied, we analyze the 
adequacy of counsel’s supporting brief.  To be adequate, the brief must satisfactorily 
establish that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues 
and has explained why those issues are frivolous.  Id.  Although “[c]ounsel need not raise 
and reject every possible claim[,] ... at a minimum, he or she must meet the 
‘conscientious examination’ standard set forth in Anders.”  Id.  If the Anders brief 
appears adequate on its face, in the second step of our analysis we will “confine our 
scrutiny to those portions of the record identified by ... [the] Anders brief,” as well as 
“those issues raised in Appellant’s pro se brief.”  Id. at 301.  Regardless of the adequacy 
of the brief, we may affirm the conviction and sentence without appointing new counsel 
if we find that the “frivolousness [of the appeal] is patent.”  United States v. Coleman, 
575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 A.  Adequacy of the Anders Brief 
 
 The Anders brief here contains an adequate examination of the potential issues for 
appeal.  Because Sepero entered a guilty plea, counsel focuses on three general issues in 
his brief: (1) whether the District Court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment and impose 
the sentence; (2) whether the guilty plea was procedurally valid and voluntary; and 
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(3) whether the District Court imposed an unreasonable sentence and abused its 
sentencing discretion.  We are satisfied that counsel’s Anders brief is adequate, and our 
examination of the record relating to the issues raised by counsel reveals no non-frivolous 
arguments.  We therefore limit further inquiry to the issues raised by Sepero in his pro se 
brief. 
 B.  Sepero’s Additional Pro Se Arguments  
 
 Although Sepero raises four additional arguments, none of them has merit and 
therefore did not need to be presented by counsel in the Anders brief.  Sepero first argues 
that his conviction and sentence should be vacated because the government breached the 
plea agreement.  Because he did not raise this issue below, we review for plain error.  See 
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133-34 (2009) (stating that the plain-error test 
applies to an unpreserved claim that the government “failed to meet its obligations under 
a plea agreement”).  In the plea agreement, the parties stipulated to a total loss amount 
between $1 million and $2.5 million.  Sepero contends that the government breached the 
agreement in three ways: by confirming the probation officer’s calculated loss amount of 
over $4 million in the PSR; by confirming the Court’s understanding that the facts 
relating to the calculated loss amount in the PSR were accurate; and by failing to disclose 
financial records to the probation officer showing that a portion of the supposed loss 
amounts were actually legitimately invested.    
 Those arguments are meritless.  The government’s statements to the probation 
officer and the Court relating to the accuracy of the facts contained in the PSR do not 
amount to a breach of its agreement.  In fact, despite the difference in loss amount, in all 
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communications with the probation office, the government expressly stated that it would 
abide by the stipulations in the plea agreement.  Further, in its communications with the 
Court, the government stressed repeatedly its recommendation that the Court impose a 
sentence within the stipulated guidelines range, reflecting the lower loss amount, as 
opposed to the higher range recommended in the PSR.  Furthermore, Sepero himself 
eventually agreed at the sentencing hearing that the facts relating to the loss amount 
calculations were correct.  Thus, the government did not breach the plea agreement by 
also confirming the Court’s understanding of the pertinent facts, nor by failing to provide 
records that supposedly showed a reduction in the loss amount due to legitimate 
investments.   
 Sepero’s remaining arguments are similarly frivolous.  He argues that the Court 
erred in imposing a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(18)(B).  That 
argument fails because, in the plea agreement, Sepero stipulated that section 
2B1.1(b)(18)(B) applied and that it resulted in a four-level increase to his offense level.  
United States v. Cianci, 154 F.3d 106, 110 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a defendant 
cannot challenge an enhancement on appeal to which he stipulated in the plea 
agreement).   
 He also contends that the District Court erred in imposing a term of supervised 
release consecutive to his term of imprisonment.  He claims that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) 
requires that any supervised release be part of the total sentence and cannot be imposed in 
addition to a term of imprisonment.  That is simply incorrect.  Courts may impose a term 
of supervised release in addition to a maximum term of imprisonment.  See, e.g., United 
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States v. Jenkins, 42 F.3d 1370, 1371 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding a sentence ordering 
supervised release in addition to the maximum term of imprisonment); United States v. 
Jamison, 934 F.2d 371, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (interpreting the supervised release statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(a), as authorizing imposition of supervised release “in addition to any 
authorized term of imprisonment, not by conversion of a portion thereof”).   
 Sepero’s final argument is that his constitutional rights were violated when he was 
arraigned before a magistrate judge without his express consent.  The common practice of 
having a magistrate judge preside over an arraignment is, however, authorized by both 
statute and local rule.  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Local Crim. R. 5.1(g).  There is no 
requirement that the defendant expressly consent, where, as here, the defendant simply 
enters a plea of not guilty.4  See Local Crim. R. 51(g) (authorizing a magistrate judge to 
conduct arraignments “to the extent of taking a not guilty plea …”).  A magistrate judge 
may hear “any pretrial matter” other than eight exceptions listed in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(1)(A), and Congress considered post-indictment arraignments to be a “pretrial 
matter” within this definition.  See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869 n.16 
(1989) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162); see also Peretz v. 
United States, 501 U.S. 923, 931 (1991) (distinguishing “subsidiary matters” not 
requiring consent); In re Artis, 955 F.2d 40 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (noting that 
“magistrate judges may act on preliminary, nondispositive matters without the consent of 
the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)” and that such “delegation of preliminary 
                                              
 
4 Sepero later changed his plea to guilty before the District Court, which the Court 
accepted after conducting a detailed plea hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11.    
 8 
 
matters to the magistrate judge does not violate Article III”).  Thus, Sepero’s argument 
fails.  
III. Conclusion 
 We will therefore grant Counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the District 
Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence. 
